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The most current challenges faced by Moslem in terms of Islamic religious discourse are religious
interpretation on gender equality on position men and women. Among long crucial debate related to
the issue is position of  men and women in testimony, when the place of  two women witnesses which
are conceived equal to one man. It seems an ambivalent takes place regarding Islamic religious interpre-
tation when many verses mentioned in the Quran and some h }adiths have declared explicitly the same
shared opportunity and capacity as well as mutual relation between men and women as vicegerents
(khalifah) of God on the earth, meanwhile in the practice which inherited over centuries demonstrated
inequality of men and women. This contrast, however, ultimately indicates a tension between Islam
that ethically egalitarian and historically determined. This article tries to seek an Islamic view of justice on
women testimony by arguing the importance of contextualizing interpretation by revitalizing appropri-
ate maxim of Quran exegetes and up grading maqa >s}id studies in order to find a more equal and just
religious interpretation on women in Islam.
Di antara tantangan terbesar yang dihadapi Muslim saat ini terkait diskursus keagamaan Islam adalah
pemahaman keagamaan tentang persamaan gender antara pria dan wanita. Termasuk perdebatan panjang
dalam masalah itu adalah dalam persoalan kesaksian, yang mana kesaksian dua wanita kerap diposisikan
setara dengan seorang pria. Kelihatannya terjadi ambivalensi di sini manakala banyak ayat Al-Qur’an dan
hadits menyebutkan secara terang-benderang kesamaan kesempatan dan kapasitas yang dimiliki oleh
pria dan wanita dalam mengemban tugasnya sebagai khalifah di muka bumi. Sementara dalam tataran
praktis, seperti yang telah terwariskan sepanjang abad, menampakkan ketidaksetaraan antara pria dan
wanita. Anomali ini, pada gilirannya, menunjukkan tekanan yang saling tarik-menarik antara Islam yang
secara etis sangat egaliter dengan historisitas yang kian determinan. Artikel ini berupaya mencari pandangan
Islam tentang keadilan terkait kesaksian wanita berargumenkan pentingnya kontekstualisasi interpretasi
dengan merevitalisasi kaidah-kaidah penfasiran Al-Qur’an yang lebih sesuai serta penekanan pada urgennya
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studi maqa >s}id dalam rangka menemukan interpretasi keagamaan yang lebih sesuai, adil dan setara terkait
kedudukan wanita di dalam Islam.
Keywords: Women testimony; Gender equality; Islamic legal reasoning; Contextualizing
interpretation, Maqa >s}id Shari >’ah.
Introduction
Among long crucial debate regarding Islamic religious interpretation, related to position of
men and women in testimony, is the place of  two women witnesses which are conceived
equal to one man. Many reasons are adopted and subjected to justify this inequality circum-
stance, either with literally some proof  interpretations laid on Quran verse and Prophet’s
traditions (h}adiths), or psychological and sociological reasons of  intellectual deficiency, less
reliable until less credible of testimony belongs to women rather than to those the men.
The debate, however, emerged from the interpretation of the verse in Quran (2:282)
which seems stated explicitly, when Allah commands the believers to bring two men wit-
nesses, or in the absence of two men, a man and two women, to witness certain types of
contracts, because the verse talks about financial transaction. Two words that come in the
verse dealing with women condition, which literally in Arabic meant and understood as “to
forget” (an tad}hilla) and “to remember” (fa tudhakkira), have been looked as the justification
that women deficiency required the presence of a man and two women witnesses, in case
of the absence of two men witnesses, in any financial transactions (al-’Alwani, 1996: 174).
This kind of interpretation on inequality men and women is appeared, recited, inherited
generation by generation over centuries and then developed which later accepted as taken
for granted and became “a should be” interpretation within Islamic discourse in Moslem
society since long time ago. Meanwhile, one thing more likely overlooked that there are
many verses mentioned in the Quran and some h}adiths which have declared explicitly the
same shared opportunity and capacity as well as mutual relation between men and women
as vicegerents (khali>fah) of God on the earth (Al-Ghazali, 34-37).
The inequality circumstance finally led us to a more curious question on how should the
verse on women testimony be understood and interpreted in terms of  position both men
and women, especially in the current contemporary time which demands a more equal and
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egalitarian condition between men and women? Is the number of witness becoming im-
portant as the essence of the message or is there anything else core value of the verse? What
kind of attempt could be exerted in order to bridge contradict interpretation between this
verse on women testimony and other verses in Quran and h}adiths (Pophet’s tradition) which
stated explicitly the same status of all believers, men and women? Is the verse of testimony
being reasonable (ta’aqquli>) or should be obeyed for worship purposes only (ta’abbudî)?
Could the verse on women testimony be contextualized upon condition and situation?
Although many verses in the Quran clearly mentioned that women who are believers
have the same shared chance and being as the partners of men in many various situations,
but the interpretation that based on inequality of number referred as a condition of defi-
ciency and capacity to remember belongs to women is still strongly being the mainstream.
This circumstance, thereby required at the last, the presence of two women, such witness as
you approve of, lest one of  the two (women) err, and then the other will remind her.
Nevertheless, the view on women testimony which has been shared among Muslim
jurists and scholars since classical era to modern doesn’t required the reasons and the meth-
ods of  Quran verse interpretation alike. Turning from this point, it becomes more signifi-
cance to know more on the methods and reasoning process of Quran verse on women
testimony, used by Muslim scholars, which ultimately leads at the last to a comprehensive
understanding of  justice in Islam related to gender equality.
This paper will examine the view of Islam on justice dealing with gender equality issue
by putting Quran verse exegetes on women testimony (2:282) as the focus by using bibliog-
raphy study. To equip, this article will be enriched by literature study on the background of
the verse revelation (asba>b nuzu>l) and on what the verse discusses about, with a little consid-
eration to the books of Quran exegetes that are mostly written by men either in the classical
time or contemporary era as the compared references. Equally important, to know more on
coherently thinking and consistently reasoning used by Muslim jurists in interpretation process,
the maxims in Quran exegetes and Islamic legal reasoning will be examined to get a deeper
understanding of  the issue, particularly in terms of  equal relation of  men and women.
I argue that literally Quran verses interpretation on women testimony mostly ignored
the core value and ethical equality of the principles of Islam. Thus, in search of the core
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view of Islam on justice regarding women testimony should be read and contextualized in
various approaches to get a more comprehensive understanding of Islam related to the
issue.
To this end, the second section will provide literature review on women testimony verse
exegetes and some current contemporary studies on the issue. The third section will discuss
Islamic legal reasoning to find appropriate method within Islamic law perspective dealing
with Quran verse interpretation, while the fourth section will present some attempts done
by Muslim scholars either in medieval time or contemporary regarding women testimony
verse interpretation, continued by fifth section in search of a new interpretation on the verse
and at the last will be closed by concluding remark.
On women testimony verse exegetes (2:282): literature review
It is no doubt that Islam, as a revealed religion, has put the core value within its principles on
brotherhood and equality related to the position of men and women. That value could be
concluded and also reflected from many verses in the Quran which obviously mentioned that
women who are believers have the same shared chance and being as the partners of men in
many various situations and different aspects of life. This value which strongly based and
rooted to the main sources of Islam, i.e. Quran and h}adith, has broadly been accepted and
applied among Muslim society in the time of revelation to abolish the customs, traditions and
inequality circumstances of pre-Islamic Arab society (al-’Alwani, 1996: 174-5).
That kind of just Islamic teachings is important to be mentioned here that Islam has its
own revealed comprehensive view in terms of  defining justice regarding position of  men
and women in society. This view, however, still be preserved and maintained within the
Moslem society framework until inequality interpretation of Quran came into surface and
became the mainstream interpretation by arguing with some proofs and evidences, quoted
from Quran for then perceived as a legitimated authority to give the right meaning and
interpretation of Quran (Fadl, 2003: 98-140).
This latter kind of interpretation has also been tried to be justified and corroborated
with some limitations perceived belong to women in terms of  intellectual deficiency, less
reliable, less credible in certain situation which could be categorized as some inherited psy-
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chological and sociological prejudices among society. To support this view, some verses in
Qur’an such as shown in the verse (2:282) regarding women testimony which required two
women and one man, in case of the absence of two men as the witness, was used to justify
that such limitation as the obstacle of an equal condition between men and women.
In fact, inequality in number regarding women testimony of two women equal to one
man, as stated above, actually derived from literally interpretation from the verse so-called
verse of debt (a>yat al-dayn) in Quran (2:282). Within interpretation process, one thing couldn’t
be dismissed that the understanding of a text has more to do with the context surrounding
the text when it appeared than with the text itself. Many Muslim jurists categorized the verse
as recommended or merely instructional (irsha>d) and without legal import rather than an
obligatory or i>ja>b (al-’Alwani, 1996: 173). The whole meaning of the verse as follow:
“O, you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing.
Let someone (learned) write down in justice. No person (able to write) should refuse to
write as God has taught him, so let him write, and let him who incurs the debt dictate,
and let him observe his duty to God, his Lord, and diminish not thereof. But if  he who
owes the debt is an ignorant or feeble-minded person, or unable himself to dictate, then
let the guardian of his interests dictate in justice. And call to witness, from among your
men, two witnesses. And if  two men be not (at hand) then a man and two women, of
such as you approve as witnesses, so that if one (woman) errs (through forgetfulness)
the other will remember. And the witnesses must not refuse when they are summoned.
Be not averse to writing down (the contract) whether it is small or great, with (record
of) the term thereof. That is more equitable in the sight of  God and better for testi-
mony, and the best way of  avoiding doubt between you~ except only in the case when
it is actual merchandise that you transfer among yourselves from hand to hand. In that
case it is no sin on you if you write it not. See that witnesses are present when you sell to
one another, and let no harm be done to the person who wrote or the witness. If  you
do (harm to them) lo! It is a sin in you. Fear God, and God will teach you. And God is
Knower of all things” (Pickthall, 1930: 2:282).
Among the reasons to be used as justification regarding women testimony in the verse,
it is understood and looked at the stressing point of the message explicitly for seeking
testimony from two women in place of the testimony of one man, by saying, “…if two
men be not (at hand) then a man and two women, of such as you approve as witnesses, so
that if one (woman) errs (through forgetfulness) the other will remember”.
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It is not easy to define when exactly the literally interpretation of “two women equal to
one man” regarding testimony matter, arose and eventually accepted as a final decision
among Muslim jurists within Islamic discourse, as performed in many classical Muslim
works. Oppositely, different understanding on the verse was addressed by some contem-
porary Muslim scholars to reject such literally interpretation attempt that loosen the essence
of Islamic justice by understanding the core message in Islam on equality of men and
women. Other critiques also delivered in different senses dealing with imbalance position
and power of  men and women within Islamic society, as demonstrated through some
contemporary works and interpretations.
It is necessary to mention here different views aroused by some contemporary modern
Muslim scholars regarding verse interpretation. According to a Muslim feminist, Amina
Wadud, the condition of  inequality of  men and women could be not separated from the
traditional verse-by-verse method of  Qur’anic exegesis (tafsi>r bil ma’thu>r) which along domi-
nated by male practitioners, thus has marginalized female experiences in understanding
revelation (Wadud-Muhsin, 1994: 1-2).
Similarly, such interpretation of  inequality has also broadly criticized by Mernissi who
pointed out that criticisms of the religious scholars are not so much that they found their
own misogynism confirmed by God revelation, but rather they failed in creating “prin-
ciples, laws or axioms that would allow the reader to distinguish the structural from the
circumstantial” (Mernissi, 1987: 127). To agree or disagree, both comments by Wadud and
Mernissi, however, shown us—to somehow—male-dominate interpretations among the
Muslim jurists and scholars in classical era which almost ignored the ethical equality of the
principles of Islam.
Those comments, whether agreed or not, could also be confronted to a study finding
by Taha Jabir al-’Alwani who did bibliography research and found that the method and the
way of Quranic interpretation on the word reminding in the verse was interpreted that a
woman who gives testimony, and who is helped through another woman’s reminding,
becomes legally equal to a man. This commentator interpretation, according to Al-’Alwani,
could be traced back to classical era such as Sufyan ibn ‘Uyaynah (d. 814 AD/ 198 AH).
Meanwhile, other commentators including Al-Thabari (d. 923 AD/ 310 AH) who wrote
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the earliest book of  Quran exegetes on verse-by-verse method (tafsi>r bil ma’thu>r), rejected
the view that based on the other’s reminding has the effect of  causing the first woman to
remember what she had forgotten. The generation of Quranic commentators who came
after Al-Thabari did not go beyond these two positions, namely only the woman remem-
bered after being reminded legally equal to one man; or another view that the combination
of the forgetful woman and the reminding woman could then be legally equal to one man
who remembers (al-’Alwani, 1996: 178).
This interpretation of inequality ultimately indicates a tension between Islam that ethi-
cally egalitarian and historically determined. This statement could also be confirmed to a
study conducted by Mohammad Fadel on the production, reproduction and application
of medieval Islamic law on the gender equality issue as it appears in the works of Sunni
jurists from post-Ayyubid 12th century. The study was done in searching the gender based
distinctions established in the medieval Islamic law of testimony through the arguments
made by Al-Qarafi (13th-century Maliki jurist) and al-Tarabulusi (15th-century Syrian Hanafi
jurist). The study finding showed that despite explicitly the reports of men and women are
equally probative in front of  the court, but the law refused to consider an individual woman’s
statement a proof (h}ujjah) because the law obliged her to stay at home in order to avoid
social corruption and disorder. One another reason which is perceived as corroboration the
former, that women are inherently deficient in reason and religion (al-nisa>’ na>qica>t al-‘aql wal
di>n). Thus, the women in many circumstance, ultimately become politically marginalized
social actors (Fadel, 1997: 186-194).
The same conclusion but in different sense regarding imbalance position between men
and women is also delivered by Abou El Fadhl, in terms of  defining religious authority and
religious authoritarian regarding women manners and activities in the public sphere. By
examining the fatwa (non binding Islamic legal opinion) issued by CRLO (Council for Sci-
entific Research and Legal Opinions), a religious Islamic institution in Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Abou El Fadhl criticizes that many fatwas issued dealing with women issue are
mainly based on misogynism rather than the finest understanding of  Islamic legal reasoning
which are corroborated by interpretation of  evidences and proofs.
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These researches findings get its significance to demonstrate because either in classical or
modern era, mostly interpretation on women testimony is alike, as what we will see next in
some Quran exegetes. The idea reasons which have been shared over centuries back to the
given meaning of the verse (2:282) on word (an tad}hilla) which literally in Arabic meant and
understood as “to forget” and word (fa tudhakkira) as “to remember” that indicates at the
last the women are inherently deficient in reason and religion (na>qica>t al-‘aql wal di>n). The
reasons which have been argued by those are various, as well. The theologian Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi (d. 1210 AD) explained that the woman’s different biological nature made her more
prone to forget than a man (Al-Razi, 1981: 7/122-123). A well-known Mu’tazilate thinker
and commentator of the Quran, Zamakhsyari (d. 538 AH), wrote the same reason that
possibility to forget as a deficiency in women so that need two women if one (woman) errs
the other will remember. In addition, Zamakhsyari quoted Abu Hanifah (founder of  Hanafi
school in Islamic jurisprudence) that women testimony which supported by men are ac-
cepted as long as it doesn’t related to Islamic penal law such as qica>c (murder) and h}udu>d
(Zamakhsyari, 2009: 156). Similarly, for the modern Quran exegetes works, Sayyid Qumb
(d. 1966 AD) through his masterwork, Fi> “ilâl Qur’a>n, argued that the requirement of two
women presence is more caused by woman’s psychology, specifically her motherly in-
stincts, that prevented her from possessing the objectivity necessary for a witness (Qumb,
2003: 335-336).
Still in the verse interpretation, a rational question arose and addressed by Ibnul ‘Arabiy
(D. 543AH/1148 AD) in his work, Ah}ka>mul Qur’a>n. After mentioning the comments on
the verse as mentioned above, he asked rhetorically, “What if  there is one woman and one
man, so that the man can remind her if she forgets?”, “What is the wisdom in that?”, But
immediately, he goes on to nullify the question by stating: “The answer is that Allah legislates
what He wills, and He knows better what wisdom lies behind His legislation. It is certainly
not essential that His creation should know and understand that the wisdom in what he
legislates for their betterment and welfare” (‘Abdillah Ibn al-‘Arabiy: 1/337). So, it could be
summed up shortly, that after proposed this rhetorical question, Ibnul ‘Arabiy then arrived
to a conclusion that this verse of women testimony close to be obeyed for worship pur-
poses only (ta’abbudi>) rather than being reasonable (ta’aqquli>).
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Different interpretation on the verse seems came into the surface when the celebrated
Muslim reformer from Egypt, Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905 AH) with his student and his
disciple, Muhammad Rasyid Ridha (d. 1935 AH) rejected the requirement of two women
witnesses based on the different nature of men and women. Through his masterwork,
Tafsi>r al-Mana>r, he argued that both men and women have the same capacity for remem-
bering and forgetting. Thus, the different economic roles of  men and women in society
made each vulnerable to forgetting those things that were not part of their (men or women)
daily experience (Rasyid Ridha, 1367: 3/122-123).
In similar to Abduh’s view, equally important to be mentioned here what has been
exerted by a well-known contemporary Muslim reformist from Tunisia, Muhammad Al-
Thahir Ibn ‘Ashur (d. 1973 AH) who broadly known as an Ulama Maqa>s }id (the Muslim
scholar whose expert on the purposes of sharia), tried to analyzed the verse by using a
methodology in us }u>l fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence principles) to find the basis of  the verse’s
circumstantial context (‘illah). He found that it doesn’t mean that women testimony is not
accepted until it couldn’t presence the main requirement of  two men witnesses. The pur-
pose of sharia on the issue of two women witnesses is for the simplicity and easiness
(tawsi’ah) of humankind in any financial transactions by engaging women within, unlike the
pre-Islamic Arab traditions (ibn ‘Ashur, 1984: 3/108).
Various different interpretations above by Muslim scholars shows in very simply that the
Quran verse on women testimony is closed to be a thinkable matter (al-mumkin al-tafki>r
fi>hi)—to borrow Arkoun’s terminology—that the reasons behind the verse still possible to
be looked for. It doesn’t purely indicate the verse as a permanent thesis (qam’iyya>t) that
couldn’t be reasonable. The testimony itself is quite related to Islamic law domain, so that
become necessary to discuss here the methods and reasoning of Islamic law and jurispru-
dence, in terms of  understanding the corridor, purpose and scope of  the verse regarding
women testimony.
Islamic legal reasoning
In the field of Islamic law and jurisprudence studies, an important process that could be
not dismissed by the actor (faqi>h) who engages in searching and producing certain decisions
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on Islamic law is legal reasoning that should be undergone within the process, compiled in
ushu>l fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence principles). There are, at least, three methods with its various
tools of each method, that recognized and applicable within ushu>l fiqh, namely: baya>ni>, this
reasoning process that emphasizes on the language and semantic approach to figure out the
real meaning (h}aqi>qah lughawiyyah) or metaphor one (h}aqi>qah maja>ziyyah) particularly in Arabic
in understanding any comments or prohibitions of God which mentioned in the main
sources, Quran and h}adith. The second method is known as ta’li>li> which means an exertion
to find the basis of  the verse’s circumstantial context (‘illah) whether in Quran or h}adith. In
certain verses and conditions in Quran and h}adith, ‘illah is mentioned explicitly or implicitly
which needs at the last to a long deep attempt and journey by a faqi>h to search the main
reasoning of  God’s legislation. And the last but not the least, the method istishla>hi> as the
reasoning process done by the faqi>h to seek the common principles in Islam as mentioned in
Quran and h}adith to realize graceful, kindness, wisdom, for humankind as the universal
message of  the Islamic sharia law in realizing interest (mas }lah}at) and avoiding any harm
matters (Al-Duwaylibi>, 1995: 347-361).
According to discussion above on women testimony as performed in classical Muslim
works, mostly interpretations made in Quran verse exegetes (2:282) based on baya>ni> method
by putting literally meaning of word “an tad}hilla” that understood as “to err and to forget”
and another one, (fa tudhakkira) which meant “to remember”. Such attempt also noticed
and confirmed by Al-Alwani that “according to Arabic Lexicon, the underlying meaning of
word d}ala>l in the verse is “absence”. Later, the word was used to indicate any turning from
the right way, whether intentionally or otherwise. The word came to be used in the sense of
“to forget”, for the reason that one who forgets is one for whom the right way is absent.
The wisdom in the Quran’s choice of  this word, rather than one usually chosen to mean “to
forget” (nisya>n) or “to err” (khatha’) is perhaps that meaning of d}ala>l is broader and more
comprehensive than the other two, as a mistake in testimony may be either intentional or
unintentional.” (al-’Alwani , 1996: 178).
Moving from semantic approach to find the real word meaning of the verse, it is a
serious attempt, as well, to analyze the verse by using ta’li>li> method to find the basis of  the
verse’s circumstantial context (‘illah) as shown by the work of  Ibn ‘Ashur. According to
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‘Ashur, it doesn’t mean that women testimony is not accepted until it couldn’t present the
main requirement of  two men witnesses. So that he emphasized that the purpose of  sharia
on the issue of two women witnesses is for the simplicity and easiness (tawsi’ah) of human-
kind in any financial transactions by engaging women within, unlike the pre-Islamic Arab
traditions.
Turning from this point, it is necessary to redefine this verse on women testimony whether
it is closer to be obeyed for worship purposes only (ta’abbudi>) or being reasonable (ta’aqquli>)
regarding inequality number of witnesses between men and women, so that it could be
understood later contextually in a broader scale, in order to find the core message behind
the verse and ultimately arrive at the spirit of justice in Islam.
Contextualizing interpretation
Islamic law may have been derived ultimately from revelation, but when it tried to be
applied within society, it was no longer being interpreted solely with reference to revelation.
It should be merged with the condition that surrounding the community where it be imple-
mented. This way is known as a mix-merge process to get a more contextual interpretation
by interpreting revelation (fahm nushûsh) and interpreting reality (fiqh al-wâqi’) on how it could
be applied simultaneously (Mubarrak, 2012: 5).
As mentioned in many Quran verse exegetes regarding women testimony above, mostly
commentators and interpreters opined inequality of men and women based on abilities
and propensity to forget of women by putting literally meaning of word “an tad}hilla” in the
verse that understood as “to err and to forget” and another one, (fa tudhakkira) which
meant “to remember”. This kind of interpretation seems on the contrary with the main
message in Islam on equality gender between men and women which at the last indicates a
tension between Islam that ethically egalitarian and historically determined (Fadel, 1997:
199).
To prove this statement, it is important to be mentioned here that through historical
account within Muslem society, it looks an ambivalent occurs—whether intentionally or
unintentionally—to differ and make separation and distinction what later perceived as po-
litical speech (syaha>dah) and normative speech (riwa>yah). In terms of  riwa>yah, among the first
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generation of Muslims, there were several women who were involved in both the trans-
mission of  religion as well as the development of  its legal doctrine. To mention one of  the
most prominent of  these women was ‘Aisyah bint Abu Bakr, the youngest wife of  the
Prophet Muhammad and who also recited among the most many of h}adith. Among the
main requirement in reciting h}adith and then to be authentically acceptable is credible indi-
vidual (‘adl) as the qualified narrator. This strict requirement, however, has been fulfilled by
‘Aisyah alone, so that her riwa>yah was accepted. On the contrary, the requirement of  testi-
mony on political speech (syaha>dah) as understood on the verse must put two women equal
to one man based on women deficiency, less reliable, less credible and prone to forget
which are close to sociological condition rather than capacity and ability that belonged to.
Although this view could be not generalized, but it is important to notice here based on
study done by Fadel that along Islamic jurists history, we can find a few but important
jurists, namely the Syrian Hanbalites Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1327 AD) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya
(d. 1350 AD) who rejected this kind of distinction between political speech (syaha>dah) and
normative speech (riwa>yah). Based on the fact that the women’s transmission of  Prophetic
reports was admissible, the purpose of testimony was to gain truth about a past even.
Therefore, if a woman was believed to be reliable in her testimony regarding religious
matter, she must be assumed, all things being equal, also to be reliable in other areas of life.
To strengthen the view, it should be taken into account that testimony of  men or women
should be ruled as long as that evidence was likely to be true and trustworthy, regardless of
their gender. For this reason, both Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya rejected the
two women equal to one man rule that lay at the heart of  discrimination against women’s
testimony. Whenever a woman has shown herself  to be credible, her evidence should be
admitted (Fadel, 1997: 196-198).
The contrast interpretation among Muslim jurists as mentioned above has shown to us
that how some respected Muslim scholars attempted to put words in the Quran—to some-
how—for the sole purpose of supporting prevalent social ideas, so that gender biased
interpretation hardly avoided (al-’Alwani, 1996: 180-181). Meanwhile the core message and
value of Islam as stated in Quran and h}adith regarding position and condition of men and
women explicitly emphasizing on mutual relation and gender equality which have been the
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reasons what Islam revealed for.
To sum up, in the last, the Quran verse exegetes interpretation on women testimony
seems need to be contextualized to find a more reasonable spirit of Islam on justice of
equality gender, particularly dealing with women testimony.
In search of a new interpretation
How to read Quran in the current context which appropriate, acceptable, reasonable and
applicable to the contemporary time are the real challenges faced by Muslim in modern era.
There are many issues which mentioned in Quran related to religious matters come into the
surface at the present time seems needed to be reinterpreted, particularly on gender equality
issue.
The inquiry emerges for instance, on how to interpret the meaning of equality and
justice on Quran verse regarding two women equal to one man in testimony. The equality
demand here absolutely doesn’t mean how to make a shift and change inequality number
paradigm to becoming directly equal one woman one man. The problem is not that easy.
To make valuable change on Quran interpretation is not only change in meaning, but it is
also strictly related to on how is paradigm constructed, what maxims dealing with Quran
interpretation being used and how is legal reasoning been preserved to explain such shifting
paradigm?
There are few maxims have been made, agreed and examined scientifically by Muslim
commentators within Quran study that could be applied in Quran verse interpretation
process, especially to the study on the background of the verse revelation (asba>b nuzu>l).
Among others is “The conclusion is made by a certain cause, not by general word mean-
ing” (al-‘ibratu bi khus}u>s sabab, la> bi ‘umu>m lafdh). Based on this maxim, it becomes an impor-
tant thing to be questioned here, could the Quran verse on women testimony be under-
stood and read in the spirit of equal number by putting an equal meaning that whenever a
woman has shown herself to be credible and reliable as the main requirement, her evidence
and testimony should be admitted. Do women have the same chance and opportunity like
men regarding testimony as long as they have required credible and reliable qualification? If
so, to what extent it could be applicable in various religious and legal matters? It will be a
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long journey to elaborate more and strengthen such opinion which should be corroborated
with sufficient arguments and proofs, as well, so that it can be responsible generalized
scientifically.
Another way or method that can be proposed in searching of a new interpretation on
the issue is by upgrading the maqa>s }id  (purposes of sharia) discipline as the most valuable
study within current Islamic sharia law studies to seek the wisdom, object, purpose, mas }lah}at
(interest), goodness and gracious for humankind of  each God’s sharia legislation either in
Quran or h}adith.
Many have done and conducted regarding maqa>s }id studies in this contemporary era
especially after the era of  Ibnu ‘Ashur. In terms of  women testimony, according to ‘Ashur,
the Quran verse is still reasonable; so that he emphasized that the purpose of sharia on the
issue of two women witnesses is for the simplicity and easiness (tawsi’ah) of humankind in
any financial transactions by engaging women within, unlike the pre-Islamic Arab traditions.
For the present current maqa>s }id studies, there are various attempts have been done by
maqa>s }id  scholars such as demonstrated by Ahmad Raisuni in order to get the core purpose
and wisdom of  any God’s legislation in sharia law by differentiating what is the should
purpose literal meaning (maqa>s }id  khima>b) from what could be the secret and purpose of
that God’s legislation? (Raisuniy, 2014: 11-21). However, such methods still should be ex-
erted more continuously in order to find acceptable, reasonable and applicable to the con-
temporary time on women testimony in order to find a more just and equal interpretation
within Islamic view.
Concluding remark
I began this article with the statement that the place of two women witnesses which are
conceived equal to one man regarding Islamic religious interpretation is among long crucial
debate within Muslim jurists and commentators. The debate itself  emerged from the inter-
pretation of  the verse in Quran (2:282) which seems stated explicitly, when Allah com-
mands the believers to bring two men witnesses, or in the absence of two men, a man and
two women, to witness certain types of contracts, because the verse talks about financial
transaction. Two words that come in the Quran verse broadly discussed dealing with women
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condition, which literally in Arabic meant and understood as “to forget” (an tad}hilla) and
“to remember” (fa tudhakkira). Mostly commentators and interpreters opined inequality of
men and women based on abilities and propensity to forget of women by putting literally
meaning of word “an tad}hilla” in the verse that understood as “to err and to forget” and
another one, (fa tudhakkira) which meant “to remember”. This kind of interpretation seems
on the contrary with the main message in Islam on equality gender between men and
women. Many verses mentioned in the Quran and some h}adith have declared explicitly the
same shared opportunity and capacity as well as mutual relation between men and women
as vicegerents (khalifah) of God on the earth. This contrast, however, ultimately indicates a
tension between Islam that ethically egalitarian and historically determined.
An ambivalent view regarding women testimony—whether intentionally or uninten-
tionally—also can be seen when an attempt arose to differ and make separation and distinc-
tion what later perceived as political speech (syaha>dah) and normative speech (riwa>yah). In
terms of  riwa>yah, among the first generation of  Muslims, there were several women who
were involved in both the transmission of religion as well as the development of its legal
doctrine. To mention one of  the most prominent of  these women was ‘Aisyah bint Abu
Bakr. Among the main requirement in reciting h}adith and then to be authentically acceptable
is credible individual (‘adl) as the qualified narrator. This strict requirement, however, has
been fulfilled by ‘Aisyah alone so that her riwa>yah was accepted. On the contrary, the require-
ment of testimony on political speech (syaha>dah) as understood on the verse must put two
women equal to one man based on women deficiency, less reliable, less credible and prone
to forget which are close to sociological condition rather than capacity and ability that
belonged to.
Equally important to be added here as the concluding remark that I also have proposed
two methods, namely: revitalizing an appropriate maxim of Quran exegetes regarding
women position in Islam and up grading maqa>s }id studies in searching a more just and equal
interpretation regarding women testimony based on Islamic view. I suggest for following
research and study emphasizes on an applied reconstruction regarding Islamic legal reason-
ing in terms of  equal interpretation between men and women.
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